Abstract (Rene Peralta)
We show how to produce short proofs of
theorems such that a distrusting Verifier can be convinced that
the theorem is true yet obtains no information about the proof itself.
The paper makes use of what we have called ``set certification'',
which consists of proving that a vector of bit commitments encodes a vector
of bits in a given set without revealing the bit-vector itself. We have high
hopes for what useful results this technique might eventually yield. Since our
shortest proofs don't exactly fit any of the published categories of
zero-knowledge proofs, we have named them ``discreet proofs''. As an
example of the power of these techniques, we show discreet proofs of
knowledge of RSA and DES keys which fit on a floppy disk.
This is joint work with Joan Boyar.
Last modified: May 20, 1996.
Kim Skak Larsen
(kslarsen@imada.sdu.dk)