Institut for Matematik og Datalogi Syddansk Universitet September 23, 2019 JFB

# Cryptology - 2019 - Lecture 7

## Announcement (repeated)

Notice the announcements about IMADA Future posted around IMADA. There will be presentations from four former computer science students from IMADA and 3-4 former math students. 26 different companies will be represented. You can sign up to get a sandwich.

### Lecture, September 23

We covered section 12.2.1. We also covered DES and most of AES from chapter 13. We will finish AES in the problem session on September 24.

#### Lecture, September 26

We will cover the rest of chapter 13, except for subsection 13.5, which we will cover later. It is possible that we will begin on chapter 14.

#### Lecture, October 1

We will continue with chapter 14, prossibly covering up through section 14.4.

#### Problem session October 3

- 1. Why is there more than one type of security for hash functions if collision resistance is stronger than the others?
- 2. Suppose  $h : \mathcal{X} \to \mathcal{Y}$  is a hash function, and  $|\mathcal{X}| = N$  and  $|\mathcal{Y}| = M$ . For any  $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ , let  $h^{-1}(y) = \{x \mid h(x) = y\}$

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and let  $s_y = |h^{-1}(y)|$ . Define

$$S = |\{\{x_1, x_2\} \mid h(x_1) = h(x_2)\}|.$$

Note that S counts the number of unordered pairs in  $\mathcal{X}$  that collide under h.

(a) Prove that

$$\sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} s_y = N,$$

so the mean of the  $s_y$ 's is

$$\overline{s} = \frac{N}{M}.$$

(b) Prove that

$$S = \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \binom{s_y}{2} = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} s_y^2 - \frac{N}{2}.$$

(c) Prove that

$$\sum_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} (s_y - \overline{s})^2 = 2S + N - \frac{N^2}{M}.$$

(d) Using the result proved in part (c), and the fact that the left-hand side in part (c) is not negative, prove that

$$S \ge \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{N^2}{M} - N \right).$$

Further, show that equality is attained if and only if

$$s_y = \frac{N}{M}$$

for every  $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ . (Problem 4.1 in CTP.)

3. Suppose that  $f : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^m$  is a preimage resistant (one-way) bijection. Define  $h : \{0,1\}^{2m} \to \{0,1\}^m$  as follows: Given  $x \in \{0,1\}^{2m}$ , write x = x' ||x''| where  $x', x'' \in \{0,1\}^m$ . Then define  $h(x) = f(x' \oplus x'')$ . Prove that h is not second preimage resistant. (Note that the  $\oplus$  is a bitwise XOR.) (Problem 4.6 in CTP.)

- 4. Suppose that  $f_k : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^m$  is a family of preimage resistant (one-way) bijections, with keys  $k \in \mathcal{K}$ . Let  $n \geq 2$  be an integer, and define  $h_k(x_1, x_2, ..., x_n) = f_k(x_1) \oplus f_k(x_2) \oplus \cdots \oplus f_k(x_n)$ . Show that  $h_k$  is not collision resistant, and it is not second preimage resistant. Show the lack of collision resistance for the both the security game for weak collision resistance and the security game for collision resistance of families of functions. (From problem 4.12 in CTP.)
- 5. I may lecture at the end.