Cryptography, Number Theory, and RSA

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Outline

- Symmetric key cryptography
- Public key cryptography
- Introduction to number theory
- RSA
- Digital signatures with RSA
- Combining symmetric and public key systems
- Modular exponentiation
- Greatest common divisor
- Primality testing
- Correctness of RSA

Caesar cipher

Α	В	С	D	Е	F	G	Н	I	J	K	L	М	N	0
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
D	Е	F	G	Н	ı	J	K	L	M	N	0	P	Q	R
3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17

Р	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Υ	Z	Æ	Ø	Å
15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28
S	Т	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	Æ	Ø	Å	Α	В	С
18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	0	1	2

$$E(m) = m + 3 \pmod{29}$$

Symmetric key systems

Suppose the following was encrypted using a Caesar cipher and the Danish alphabet. The key is unknown. What does it say?

ZQOØQOØ, RI.

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What does this say about how many keys should be possible?

Symmetric key systems

- Caesar Cipher
- - Enigma
 - DES
- ► Blowfish
- ► IDEA
- ► Triple DES
- AES

Public key cryptography

```
Bob — 2 keys -PK_R,SK_R
PK_B — Bob's public key
SK<sub>B</sub> — Bob's private (secret) key
For Alice to send m to Bob.
Alice computes: c = E(m, PK_B).
To decrypt c, Bob computes:
r = D(c, SK_B).
r = m
It must be "hard" to compute SK_B from PK_B.
```

Introduction to Number Theory

Definition. Suppose $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$, a > 0. Suppose $\exists c \in \mathbb{Z}$ s.t. b = ac. Then a divides b. $a \mid b$.

a is a factor of b.

b is a multiple of a.

 $e \not| f$ means e does not divide f.

Theorem. $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}$. Then

- 1. if a|b and a|c, then a|(b+c)
- 2. if a|b, then $a|bc \ \forall c \in \mathbb{Z}$
- 3. if a|b and b|c, then a|c.

Definition. $p \in \mathbb{Z}$, p > 1.

p is prime if 1 and p are the only positive integers which divide p.

 $2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, \dots$

p is composite if it is not prime.

4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, ...

Theorem. $a \in \mathbb{Z}$, $d \in \mathbb{N}$ \exists unique $q, r, 0 \le r < d$ s.t. a = dq + r

d – divisor

a - dividend

q – quotient

r – remainder = $a \mod d$

Definition. $gcd(a, b) = \text{greatest common divisor of } a \text{ and } b = \text{largest } d \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ s.t. } d|a \text{ and } d|b$

If gcd(a, b) = 1, then a and b are relatively prime.

Definition. $a \equiv b \pmod{m}$ — a is congruent to b modulo m if $m \mid (a - b)$.

$$m \mid (a-b) \Rightarrow \exists k \in \mathbb{Z} \text{ s.t. } a = b + km.$$

Theorem.
$$a \equiv b \pmod{m}$$
 $c \equiv d \pmod{m}$
Then $a + c \equiv b + d \pmod{m}$ and $ac \equiv bd \pmod{m}$.

Proof.(of first)
$$\exists k_1, k_2 \text{ s.t.}$$

 $a = b + k_1 m$ $c = d + k_2 m$
 $a + c = b + k_1 m + d + k_2 m$
 $= b + d + (k_1 + k_2) m$

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Examples.

1.
$$15 \equiv 22 \pmod{7}$$
?

2.
$$15 \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$$
?

3.
$$15 \equiv 37 \pmod{7}$$
?

4.
$$58 \equiv 22 \pmod{9}$$
?

$$15 = 22 \pmod{7}$$
?

$$15 = 1 \pmod{7}$$
?

$$15 = 37 \pmod{7}$$
?

$$58 = 22 \pmod{9}$$
?

RSA — a public key system

```
N_A = p_A \cdot q_A, where p_A, q_A prime.

gcd(e_A, (p_A - 1)(q_A - 1)) = 1.

e_A \cdot d_A \equiv 1 \pmod{(p_A - 1)(q_A - 1)}.
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- $ightharpoonup PK_A = (N_A, e_A)$
- $\blacktriangleright SK_A = (N_A, d_A)$

To encrypt: $c = E(m, PK_A) = m^{e_A} \pmod{N_A}$. To decrypt: $r = D(c, PK_A) = c^{d_A} \pmod{N_A}$. r = m.

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Example: p = 5, q = 11, e = 3, d = 27, m = 8. Then N = 55. $e \cdot d = 81$. So $e \cdot d = 1 \pmod{4 \cdot 10}$. To encrypt m: $c = 8^3 \pmod{55} = 17$. To decrypt c: $r = 17^{27} \pmod{55} = 8$.

Digital Signatures with RSA

Suppose Alice wants to sign a document *m* such that:

- No one else could forge her signature
- It is easy for others to verify her signature

Note m has arbitrary length.

RSA is used on fixed length messages.

Alice uses a cryptographically secure hash function h, such that:

- ▶ For any message m', h(m') has a fixed length (512 bits?)
- It is "hard" for anyone to find 2 messages (m_1, m_2) such that $h(m_1) = h(m_2)$.

Digital Signatures with RSA

Then Alice "decrypts" h(m) with her secret RSA key (N_A, d_A)

$$s = (h(m))^{d_A} \pmod{N_A}$$

Bob verifies her signature using her public RSA key (N_A, e_A) and h:

$$c = s^{e_A} \pmod{N_A}$$

He accepts if and only if

$$h(m) = c$$

.

This works because s^{e_A} (mod N_A) =

$$((h(m))^{d_A})^{e_A} \pmod{N_A} = ((h(m))^{e_A})^{d_A} \pmod{N_A} = h(m).$$

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To encrypt a message m to send to Bob:

- ► Choose a random *session key k* for a symmetric key system (AES?)
- ▶ Encrypt k with Bob's public key Result k_e
- ► Encrypt m with k Result m_e
- ▶ Send k_e and m_e to Bob

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- \triangleright Send k_e and m_e to Bob

How does Bob decrypt? Why is this efficient?

Security of RSA

The primes p_A and q_A are kept secret with d_A .

Suppose Eve can factor N_A .

Then she can find p_A and q_A . From them and e_A , she finds d_A .

Then she can decrypt just like Alice.

Factoring must be hard!

Factoring

Theorem. N composite $\Rightarrow N$ has a prime divisor $\leq \sqrt{N}$

```
Factor(N)

for i = 2 to \sqrt{N} do
   check if i divides N
   if it does then output (i, N/i)

endfor

output -1 if divisor not found
```

Corollary There is an algorithm for factoring N (or testing primality) which does $O(\sqrt{N})$ tests of divisibility.

Factoring

Check all possible divisors between 2 and \sqrt{N} . Not finished in your grandchildren's life time for N with 1024 bits.

Problem The length of the input is $n = \lceil \log_2(N+1) \rceil$. So the running time is $O(2^{n/2})$ — exponential.

Open Problem Does there exist a polynomial time factoring algorithm?

Use primes which are at least 512 (or 1024) bits long. So $2^{511} \le p_A, q_A < 2^{512}$. So $p_A \approx 10^{154}$.

RSA

How do we implement RSA?

We need to find: p_A , q_A , N_A , e_A , d_A . We need to encrypt and decrypt.

We need to encrypt and decrypt: compute $a^k \pmod{n}$.

 $a^2 \pmod{n} \equiv a \cdot a \pmod{n} - 1 \mod \text{ular multiplication}$

Modular Exponentiation

```
Theorem. For all nonnegative integers, b, c, m, b \cdot c \pmod{m} = (b \pmod{m}) \cdot (c \pmod{m}) \pmod{m}. Example: a \cdot a^2 \pmod{n} = (a \pmod{n})(a^2 \pmod{n}) \pmod{n}.
```

$$8^{3} \pmod{55} = 8 \cdot 8^{2} \pmod{55}$$

= $8 \cdot 64 \pmod{55}$
= $8 \cdot (9 + 55) \pmod{55}$
= $72 + (8 \cdot 55) \pmod{55}$
= $17 + 55 + (8 \cdot 55) \pmod{55}$
= 17

```
a^2 \pmod{n} \equiv a \cdot a \pmod{n} - 1 modular multiplication a^3 \pmod{n} \equiv a \cdot (a \cdot a \pmod{n}) \pmod{n} - 2 mod mults
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This is too many! $e_A \cdot d_A \equiv 1 \pmod{(p_A-1)(q_A-1)}$. p_A and q_A have ≥ 512 bits each. So at least one of e_A and d_A has ≥ 512 bits.

To either encrypt or decrypt would need $\geq 2^{511} \approx 10^{154}$ operations (more than number of atoms in the universe).

```
a^2 \pmod{n} \equiv a \cdot a \pmod{n} - 1 modular multiplication a^3 \pmod{n} \equiv a \cdot (a \cdot a \pmod{n}) \pmod{n} - 2 mod mults How do you calculate a^4 \pmod{n} in less than 3?
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```

Modular Exponentiation

```
\mathsf{Exp}(a, k, n) \quad \{ \mathsf{Compute} \ a^k \ (\mathsf{mod} \ n) \}
      if k < 0 then report error
      if k = 0 then return(1)
      if k = 1 then return(a (mod n))
      if k is odd then return(a \cdot \mathsf{Exp}(a, k-1, n) \pmod{n})
      if k is even then
             c \leftarrow \mathsf{Exp}(a, k/2, n)
             return((c \cdot c) \pmod{n})
To compute 3^6 \pmod{7}: Exp(3, 6, 7)
c \leftarrow \mathsf{Exp}(3,3,7)
```

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To compute 3^6 \pmod{7}: Exp(3, 6, 7)
c \leftarrow \mathsf{Exp}(3,3,7) \leftarrow 3 \cdot (\mathsf{Exp}(3,2,7) \pmod{7})
```

```
\mathsf{Exp}(a, k, n) \setminus \{\mathsf{Compute}\ a^k \ (\mathsf{mod}\ n)\}
       if k < 0 then report error
       if k = 0 then return(1)
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       if k is odd then return(a \cdot \text{Exp}(a, k-1, n) \pmod{n})
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To compute 3^6 \pmod{7}: Exp(3, 6, 7)
c \leftarrow \mathsf{Exp}(3,3,7) \leftarrow 3 \cdot (\mathsf{Exp}(3,2,7)) \pmod{7}
c' \leftarrow \mathsf{Exp}(3, 1, 7)
```

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\mathsf{Exp}(3,2,7) \; (\mathsf{mod} \; 7)) \leftarrow 3 \cdot 3 \; (\mathsf{mod} \; 7) \leftarrow 2
```

```
\mathsf{Exp}(a, k, n) \quad \{ \mathsf{Compute} \ a^k \ (\mathsf{mod} \ n) \}
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c \leftarrow 3 \cdot 2 \pmod{7} \leftarrow 6
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c \leftarrow 3 \cdot 2 \pmod{7} \leftarrow 6
\operatorname{Exp}(3,6,7) \leftarrow (6\cdot 6) \pmod{7} \leftarrow 1
```

How many modular multiplications?

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Divide exponent by 2 every other time. How many times can we do that?

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$$\lfloor \log_2(k) \rfloor$$

So at most $2 \lfloor \log_2(k) \rfloor$ modular multiplications.

RSA — a public key system

```
N_A = p_A \cdot q_A, where p_A, q_A prime. gcd(e_A, (p_A - 1)(q_A - 1)) = 1. e_A \cdot d_A \equiv 1 \pmod{(p_A - 1)(q_A - 1)}.
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- \triangleright $PK_A = (N_A, e_A)$
- \triangleright $SK_A = (N_A, d_A)$

To encrypt: $c = E(m, PK_A) = m^{e_A} \pmod{N_A}$. To decrypt: $r = D(c, PK_A) = c^{d_A} \pmod{N_A}$. r = m.

Try using N=35, e=11 to create keys for RSA. What is d? Try d=11 and check it. Encrypt 4. Decrypt the result.

RSA — a public key system

 $N_A = p_A \cdot q_A$, where p_A, q_A prime.

Did you get c = 9? And r = 4?

```
gcd(e_A, (p_A - 1)(q_A - 1)) = 1.
e_A \cdot d_A \equiv 1 \pmod{(p_A - 1)(q_A - 1)}.
  \triangleright PK_A = (N_A, e_A)
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To encrypt: c = E(m, PK_A) = m^{e_A} \pmod{N_A}.
To decrypt: r = D(c, PK_A) = c^{d_A} \pmod{N_A}.
r=m.
Try using N = 35, e = 11 to create keys for RSA.
What is d? Try d = 11 and check it.
Encrypt 4. Decrypt the result.
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RSA

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N_A=p_A\cdot q_A, where p_A,q_A prime. gcd(e_A,(p_A-1)(q_A-1))=1. e_A\cdot d_A\equiv 1\ (\mathrm{mod}\ (p_A-1)(q_A-1)).
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Greatest Common Divisor

```
We need to find: e_A, d_A.

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Greatest Common Divisor

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We need to find: e_A, d_A.

gcd(e_A, (p_A-1)(q_A-1))=1.

e_A\cdot d_A\equiv 1\ (\text{mod}\ (p_A-1)(q_A-1)).

Choose random e_A.

Check that gcd(e_A, (p_A-1)(q_A-1))=1.

Find d_A such that e_A\cdot d_A\equiv 1\ (\text{mod}\ (p_A-1)(q_A-1)).
```

```
Theorem. a, b \in \mathbb{N}. \exists s, t \in \mathbb{Z} s.t. sa + tb = \gcd(a, b).
Proof. Let d be the smallest positive integer in
D = \{xa + yb \mid x, y \in \mathbb{Z}\}.
d \in D \implies d = x'a + y'b for some x', y' \in \mathbb{Z}.
gcd(a,b)|a and gcd(a,b)|b, so gcd(a,b)|x'a, gcd(a,b)|y'b, and
gcd(a,b)|(x'a+y'b)=d. We will show that d|gcd(a,b), so
d = \gcd(a, b). Note a \in D.
Suppose a = dq + r with 0 < r < d.
           r = a - da
               = a - q(x'a + v'b)
               = (1 - qx')a - (qy')b
 \Rightarrow r \in D
r < d \Rightarrow r = 0 \Rightarrow d|a.
Similarly, one can show that d \mid b.
Therefore, d|gcd(a, b).
```

How do you find d, s and t?

Let
$$d = \gcd(a, b)$$
. Write b as $b = aq + r$ with $0 \le r < a$.
Then, $d|b \Rightarrow d|(aq + r)$.
Also, $d|a \Rightarrow d|(aq) \Rightarrow d|((aq + r) - aq) \Rightarrow d|r$.

Let
$$d' = \gcd(a, b - aq)$$
.
Then, $d'|a \Rightarrow d'|(aq)$
Also, $d'|(b - aq) \Rightarrow d'|((b - aq) + aq) \Rightarrow d'|b$.

Thus, $gcd(a, b) = gcd(a, b \pmod{a})$ = $gcd(b \pmod{a}, a)$. This shows how to reduce to a "simpler" problem and gives us the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.

```
{ Initialize}
         d_0 \leftarrow b s_0 \leftarrow 0 t_0 \leftarrow 1
         d_1 \leftarrow a s_1 \leftarrow 1 t_1 \leftarrow 0
          n \leftarrow 1
{ Compute next d}
while d_n > 0 do
         begin
                   n \leftarrow n + 1
                   { Compute d_n \leftarrow d_{n-2} \pmod{d_{n-1}}}
                   q_n \leftarrow |d_{n-2}/d_{n-1}|
                   d_n \leftarrow d_{n-2} - q_n d_{n-1}
                   s_n \leftarrow s_{n-2} - q_n s_{n-1}
                   t_n \leftarrow t_{n-2} - q_n t_{n-1}
         end
                                       t \leftarrow t_{n-1}
s \leftarrow s_{n-1}
gcd(a, b) \leftarrow d_{n-1}
```

Correctness follows from the algorithm maintaining the following invariant:

$$d_n = s_n a + t_n b$$

This is proved by induction.

Initialization: $b = d_0 = 0 \cdot a + 1 \cdot b$ and $a = d_1 = 1 \cdot a + 0 \cdot b$.

Step:
$$d_n = d_{n-2} - q_n d_{n-1} = (s_{n-2}a + t_{n-2}b) - q_n(s_{n-1}a + t_{n-1}) = (s_{n-2} - q_n s_{n-1})a + (t_{n-2} - q_n t_{n-1}) = s_n a + t_n b.$$

Finding **multiplicative inverses** modulo *m*:

Given a and m, find x s.t. $a \cdot x \equiv 1 \pmod{m}$.

Should also find a k, s.t. ax = 1 + km. So solve for an s in an equation sa + tm = 1.

This can be done if gcd(a, m) = 1. Just use the Extended Euclidean Algorithm.

If the result, s, is negative, add m to s. Now (s - m)a + tm = 1.

Examples

Calculate the following:

- 1. gcd(6,9)
- 2. s and t such that $s \cdot 6 + t \cdot 9 = \gcd(6,9)$
- 3. gcd(15, 23)
- 4. s and t such that $s \cdot 15 + t \cdot 23 = \gcd(15, 23)$

RSA

```
N_A=p_A\cdot q_A, where p_A,q_A prime. gcd(e_A,(p_A-1)(q_A-1))=1. e_A\cdot d_A\equiv 1\ ({
m mod}\ (p_A-1)(q_A-1)).
```

- $ightharpoonup PK_A = (N_A, e_A)$
- $\blacktriangleright SK_A = (N_A, d_A)$

To encrypt: $c = E(m, PK_A) = m^{e_A} \pmod{N_A}$. To decrypt: $r = D(c, PK_A) = c^{d_A} \pmod{N_A}$. r = m.

Primality testing

We need to find: p_A , q_A — large primes.

Choose numbers at random and check if they are prime?

1. How many random integers of length 154 are prime?

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Prime Number Theorem: about $\frac{x}{\ln x}$ numbers < x are prime

In 10¹⁵⁴ is about 355.

So we expect to test about 355 random numbers with 154 decimal digits before finding a prime.

(This holds because the expected number of tries until a "success", when the probability of "success" is p, is 1/p.)

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About $\frac{x}{\ln x}$ numbers < x are prime, which is about $\frac{10^{154}}{355}$

So we expect to test about 355 random numbers with 154 decimal digits before finding a prime.

2. How fast can we test if a number is prime?

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So we expect to test about 355 before finding a prime.

2. How fast can we test if a number is prime?

Quite fast, it turns out (in practice using randomness).

Sieve of Eratosthenes:

Lists:

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

Sieve of Eratosthenes:

Lists:

2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
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 10^{154} — more than number of atoms in universe So we cannot even write out this list!

CheckPrime(n)

```
for i = 2 to n-1 do
check if i divides n
if it does then output i
endfor
output -1 if divisor not found
```

Check all possible divisors between 2 and n (or \sqrt{n}). Our sun will die before we're done!

This is a practical, randomized primality test.

Fermat's Little Theorem: Suppose p is a prime. Then for all $1 \le a \le p-1$, $a^{p-1} \pmod{p} = 1$.

Miller-Rabin primality test:

Starts with Fermat test:

 $2^{14} \pmod{15} \equiv 4 \neq 1$. So 15 is not prime.

Repeated Fermat test:

```
Prime(n)

repeat k times

Choose random a with 1 \le a \le n-1

if a^{n-1} \pmod{n} \not\equiv 1 then return(Composite)

end repeat

return(Probably Prime)
```

Not efficient on Carmichael Numbers: Composite n, but for all $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n^*$ we have $a^{n-1} \pmod{n} \equiv 1$.

Example: $561 = 3 \cdot 11 \cdot 17$

Theorem:

If p is prime and $x^2 \pmod{n} \equiv 1$, then $x \pmod{p} = \{1, p-1\}$. If p has > 1 distinct factors and $x^2 \pmod{n} \equiv 1$, then x has at least 4 possible values.

Example: $x^2 \pmod{15} \equiv 1 \Rightarrow x = \{1, 4, 11, 14\}$

```
Take square roots of 1 (mod 561) as long as we have x^2 (mod n) \equiv 1:
```

```
50^{560} \pmod{561} \equiv 1 [(50^{280})^2 \pmod{561} \equiv 1] [(50^{140})^2 \pmod{561} \equiv 1] [(50^{140})^2 \pmod{561} \equiv 1] [(50^{140})^2 \pmod{561} \equiv 1] \vdots [(50^{140})^2 \pmod{561} \equiv 1]
```

If *n* is prime, we can only end in $\equiv 1$ or $\equiv p-1$ (for all values of *a*, here a=50).

```
2^{560} \pmod{561} \equiv 1
2^{280} \pmod{561} \equiv 1
2^{140} \pmod{561} \equiv 67
```

2 is a witness that 561 is composite.

```
Miller-Rabin(n, k)
Calculate odd m such that n-1=2^s \cdot m
repeat k times
      Choose random a with 1 \le a \le n-1
     if a^{n-1} \pmod{n} \not\equiv 1 then return(Composite)
     if a^{(n-1)/2} \pmod{n} \equiv n-1 then continue [\Rightarrow next iteration]
     if a^{(n-1)/2} \pmod{n} \not\equiv 1 then return(Composite)
     if a^{(n-1)/4} \pmod{n} \equiv n-1 then continue [\Rightarrow next iteration]
     if a^{(n-1)/4} \pmod{n} \not\equiv 1 then return(Composite)
     if a^m \pmod{n} \equiv n-1 then continue [\Rightarrow next iteration]
     if a^m \pmod{n} \not\equiv 1 then return(Composite)
end repeat
return(Probably Prime)
```

Theorem: If n is composite, at most 1/4 of the a's with $1 \le a \le n-1$ will not end in "return(Composite)" during an iteration of the **repeat**-loop.

This means that with k iterations, a composite n will survive to "return(Probably Prime)" with probability at most $(1/4)^k$. For e.g. k=100, this is less than $(1/4)^{100}=1/2^{200}<1/10^{60}$.

A prime n will always survive to "return(Probably Prime)".

Conclusions about primality testing

- 1. Miller-Rabin is a practical primality test
- 2. There is a less practical deterministic primality test
- 3. Randomized algorithms are useful in practice
- 4. Algebra is used in primality testing
- 5. Number theory is not useless

Why does RSA work?

Thm (The Chinese Remainder Theorem) Let $n_1, n_2, ..., n_k$ be pairwise relatively prime. For any integers $x_1, x_2, ..., x_k$, there exists $x \in \mathbb{Z}$ s.t. $x \equiv x_i \pmod{n_i}$ for $1 \le i \le k$. Also, x is uniquely determined modulo the product $N = n_1 n_2 ... n_k$: If $x' \in \mathbb{Z}$ s.t. $x \equiv x_i \pmod{n_i}$ for $1 \le i \le k$, then $x \equiv x' \pmod{N}$.

We consider the special case where $n_1 = p$ and $n_2 = q$ are two primes (hence N = pq), and where $x_1 = x_2 = m$.

Clearly, $m \equiv m \pmod{p}$ and $m \equiv m \pmod{q}$ for any m. So if x fulfills $x \equiv m \pmod{p}$ and $x \equiv m \pmod{q}$, then $x \equiv m \pmod{N}$.

In particular, $0 \le x, m \le N - 1$, then we must have x = m.

Fermat's Little Theorem

Why does RSA work? CRT +

Fermat's Little Theorem: p is a prime, $p \not| a$. Then $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ and $a^p \equiv a \pmod{p}$.

RSA

```
N_A=p_A\cdot q_A, where p_A,q_A prime. gcd(e_A,(p_A-1)(q_A-1))=1. e_A\cdot d_A\equiv 1\ (\mathrm{mod}\ (p_A-1)(q_A-1)).
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- $ightharpoonup PK_A = (N_A, e_A)$
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To encrypt: $c = E(m, PK_A) = m^{e_A} \pmod{N_A}$. To decrypt: $r = D(c, PK_A) = c^{d_A} \pmod{N_A}$. r = m.

Correctness of RSA

Let
$$x = D(E(m, PK_A), SK_A)$$
. Then $x \equiv (m^{e_A} \pmod{N_A})^{d_A} \pmod{N_A} \equiv m^{e_A d_A} \pmod{N_A}$.

Assume $p_A \not| m$ and $q_A \not| m$. Recall that $\exists k$ s.t. $e_A d_A = 1 + k(p_A - 1)(q_A - 1)$.

By Fermat's little theorem:

$$m^{e_A d_A} \equiv m^{1+k(p_A-1)(q_A-1)} \equiv m \cdot (m^{(p_A-1)})^{k(q_A-1)} \equiv m \cdot 1^{k(q_A-1)} \equiv m \pmod{p_A}.$$

$$m^{e_A d_A} \equiv m^{1+k(p_A-1)(q_A-1)} \equiv m \cdot (m^{(q_A-1)})^{k(p_A-1)} \equiv m \cdot 1^{k(p_A-1)} \equiv m \pmod{q_A}.$$

From the Chinese Remainder Theorem: $m^{e_A d_A} \equiv m \pmod{N_A}$. Hence, $x \equiv m^{e_A d_A} \equiv m \pmod{N_A}$, by second line at top. So x = m, as both are between 0 and N_A .

Correctness of RSA

For the remaining cases: assume $p_A|m$

Then $m = p_A k$ for some k, so for any t we have $m^t = p_A k'$ for some k'.

Hence, $m^{e_A d_A} \equiv 0 \equiv m \pmod{p_A}$.

If $q_A|m$, we can similarly show $m^{e_Ad_A} \equiv 0 \equiv m \pmod{q_A}$.

In any case, $m^{e_Ad_A} \equiv m \pmod{p_A}$ and $m^{e_Ad_A} \equiv m \pmod{q_A}$, so CRT gives that $m^{e_Ad_A} \equiv m \pmod{N_A}$. Hence, $x \equiv m^{e_Ad_A} \equiv m \pmod{N_A}$, as before.

Again, x = m, as both are between 0 and N_A .